Top Law Schools for Criminal Law | the National Jurist
Southern New Hampshire UniversityProgram: BS - Criminal Justice: Legal Studies & Advocacy Earning a degree from one of the best online law schools in the nation can The school structures its courses using an eight-week format, meaning . The program focuses on the link between health and diet, as well as the. Bethel's affordable pre-law program prepares its students for law school with a strong in political science, criminal justice, history, social studies, sociology, and the of UT's top pre-law degree is its relationship with the school's College of Law. in the Law, Policy, & Society minor are a part of the college, meaning that. May 1, They wrote: “Its aims are too ill-defined to constitute a truly The relationship between the school and the local law enforcement it Students who major in criminal justice do not necessarily plan to become police officers.
Criminal Law Criminal law revolves around governmental prosecution of anyone who is purported to have committed a criminal act, as defined by public law. An act cannot be classified as a crime if no precedent has been set by either governmental statute or common law, and suits between two individuals or organizations are considered to be civil, rather than criminal cases. Environmental Law Environmental law mostly stems from a group of federal enactments passed in that forced agencies and businesses to take into account the effect of their practices on the environment.
The enactments set into effect laws and standards that would protect the environment from public and private actions. First Amendment Law First Amendment law focuses on protecting citizens' rights to freedom of speech, religion, press, and assembly against law enacted by Congress. Litigation is made possible by the First Amendment's right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. First Amendment cases have covered everything from book burning to prayer in schools to Internet pornography.
Health Care Law Since it is primarily the state's duty to maintain public health, most heath laws and regulations are state-based. Federal health law centers on the Department of Health and Human Services, which is ultimately in charge of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Health care law practice can also cover medical malpractice, licensure, patient rights and bio-ethical policy.
It is a general category of law that deals with the acquisition and enforcement of patents, trademarks and copyrights. IP law can traditionally be broken down into three subdivisions: Patent law focuses on inventions and technology.
Health law specialists also work at academic institutions and biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. American Health Lawyers Association Immigration Law Immigration lawyers work with individual clients at all stages of the naturalization process. Other aspects of the profession relate to refugee and asylum seekers, as well as to individuals in the country without legal permission. This field of law varies significantly from country to country. Much of its practice depends on international treaties, bilateral accords, and political conjecture.
American Immigration Lawyers Association Intellectual Property Law Intellectual Property law focuses on protecting the rights of inventors, authors, and businesses to their tangible and intangible creations, inventions and symbols. Legal professionals in this field are often experts in a particular domain, such as science, the arts, or an industry. For example, trademark or copyright attorneys manage the legal aspects of contracts, visual identity, brand names, or slogans.
Technological advances, notably in digital reproduction and transmission, make this a dynamic field of law. American Intellectual Property Law Association International Law International law is broad in its conception and can be broken down into private and public sectors.
In the private sector, specialists in international law may work in finance and trade divisions of multinational corporations. Familiarity with business essentials, as well as corporate law or intellectual property law would be helpful in this field.
Criminal Law | Academics | Programs of Study | The Law School | University of Notre Dame
In the public international law, practitioners would work on cases that involve dealings between sovereign nations. Familiarity with comparative law or public international law would be most helpful for effective practice in this field. Both private and public international law are interdisciplinary in nature and would involve an understanding of the differences between common law and civil law systems across borders.
Labor law often involves collective bargaining and unions. Attorneys in this field may represent individual clients, a union, a government regulatory agency, or an employer. National Employment Lawyers Association Military Law Military law involves codes and procedures that govern legal matters in the armed forces. Sincemilitary law has been based on the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Legal experts in this field are typically members of the armed forces serving in the Judge Advocate General's Corps.
This is true of some non-human animals, and some of those with serious disabilities. Precisely because of the capacities they lack, these agents are especially vulnerable to being abused or exploited. Ex hypothesi, this does nothing to secure independence. So it is not something that can be accommodated by the exhaustive form of the Kantian view Tadros b. On another view, the value of criminal law derives from a relationship that pre-exists it: Any such community has values in terms of which it is understood by its members.
If this self-understanding is to be more than a charade, the community must actually value its defining values—it must do what those values are reasons to do. Part of what it is for a community to value life is for it to respond to the taking: Criminal law is a body of law that requires the accounting. Functionally, this is a version of the curial view. But the value of fulfilling that function is relational: This line of thought lends support to what I earlier called the communitarian view.
On that view, criminal proceedings discharge secondary duties owed to the community as a whole. That such duties are part and parcel of a valuable form of relationship helps explains why we should think that they exist. One objection to the view described in the previous paragraph is that it is unduly conservative. What justifies criminalizing a wrong—on that view—is that the wrong has a pre-existing foothold in the defining values of the community: Some communities, however, are characterised by systematic neglect of important values—by patriarchy, or racism, or distributive inequality.
When this is so, part of the justification for criminalization is not that it helps the community remain true to itself, but that it helps transform the community by reconstituting it in valuable ways Dempsey ; Both versions of the relational view—Kantian and communitarian—face another doubt.
It is plausible to think that this wrong is of concern to the criminal law in its own right. It is plausible to think that whatever further effects it might have, preventing the wrong of murder itself helps justify criminalizing murder, and bringing criminal proceedings against murderers.
On both the Kantian and communitarian views this is not the case. What justifies criminalizing wrongs, and bringing criminal proceedings against wrongdoers, is that this contributes to some larger social good—to the framework of legal rules we need for independence, or to the community remaining true to itself. We may reasonably doubt that wrongs like murder matter to the criminal law only for these further reasons. The above remarks concern the kind of value that justifies having criminal law.
We can also ask who is capable of realizing that value. If that value is to be realised, someone must act on behalf of those who stand in the relationship.
In most systems of criminal law, the job is done by the state—agents of the state create, apply, and enforce criminal laws. Some argue that in a legitimate system of criminal law this is the only possibility. This view can be developed in a number of ways. Consider again the Kantian view. Some claim that coercion secures independence only if the coercer speaks for all those coerced. Otherwise it is just another independence violation.
Only state agents can speak for all of us. So the enforcement of the criminal law must remain in their hands Thorburn a, 98— Defenders of the communitarian view tell a similar story.
On both views, it is impossible for private persons to realise the values that justify criminal law. If these arguments go through, they have obvious implications for debates about the privatization of prison and police services Dorfman and Harel They also offer us a sense in which criminal law theory must be political.
It must face up to the question of whether there are essentially public goods, and ask what role they play in justifying the existence of criminal law Harel96— Consider the prevention of harm, or the prevention of moral wrongdoing. A number of writers appeal to one or both values to justify the existence of criminal law Feinberg—; Alexander and Ferzan17; Simester and von Hirsch29— Because there are wrongless harms think of sporting injures caused without foul play and harmless wrongs think of botched conspiracies or undiscovered attempts the aforementioned values do not always wax and wane together.
A third possibility is that harms and wrongs provide two independent sources of general justification compare Tadros— Whatever the answer, this preventive value is impersonal in two ways: It is worth distinguishing between two versions of this view.
According to Moore, all culpable wrongdoers incur a duty to allow themselves to suffer. Retributive justice is done when punishment imposes that suffering, and this is what justifies the imposition of criminal punishment Moore70— Moore argues that the suffering of culpable wrongdoers is intrinsically good.
On a rival view, suffering is always intrinsically bad. We must accept, however, that in some cases not all suffering can be avoided. Sometimes we must choose between wrongdoers suffering now and others suffering at the hands of wrongdoers later. Only by imposing the former can we protect against the latter. It might look as though punishing wrongdoers for these protective reasons amounts to treating them as mere means.
But this is not necessarily so. Tadros argues that some wrongdoers incur duties to protect others at the cost of some harm to themselves. We can justify imposing punishments that come at this cost to these wrongdoers, when the punishments protect others by preventing future wrongs. As those punished are only doing their duty, we can reasonably claim that they are not treated as mere means Tadros c; Though Moore and Tadros disagree on many things, their views also have something in common.
The value to which both appeal to justify punishment is impersonal: General justifications of criminal law like those sketched in the last few paragraphs face a number of criticisms. One objection has it they are unduly expansive: But as the failure is a private matter—to be resolved by the friends themselves—there is no reason for law-makers to criminalize the wrong Duff b; Husak— There is certainly no reason for them to criminalize it when the friends are both citizens of another state, and the failure occurs in the other jurisdiction Duff Reasons to criminalize exist, as it is often put, only where law-makers have standing.
And the mere fact that a wrong generates the aforementioned secondary duties does not itself give law-makers standing to criminalize it. According to a second objection, the focus on moral wrongdoing is unduly restrictive: According to one argument for this conclusion, the stable existence of almost any valuable social institution—be it financial, educational, familial, military, or political—depends on widespread compliance with its rules.
Under realistic conditions, criminal liability for violation is necessary for stability.
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It is the value of stable institutions, not the moral wrongfulness of violating their rules, that justifies bringing criminal law into existence Chiao A third objection returns us to the asymmetry discussed at the end of section 1. Many of the powers and permissions by means of which criminal justice is done are withheld from private persons. Most obviously, private persons are not typically permitted to use force to punish others for crime.
Few think that this should be changed. Vigilantism should remain criminal. If the values that justify having criminal law are essentially public, we appear to have an easy explanation of this fact: If those values are not essentially public, things are more difficult.
Let us take the third objection first.
If impersonal values justify having criminal law, we have reason to opt for whichever set of legal rules will realise those values most efficiently. If one set of powers and permissions will achieve more of the value in question at a lower cost, we should—all else being equal—opt for that set. Now compare two sets of rules. One permits state officials and private persons alike to use force to punish criminals.
Another withholds the permissions granted to the former from the latter. We have good reason to think that the first set of rules would bring with it significant costs. Private persons are likely to make more mistakes about who committed crimes, and about how much punishment is appropriate for criminality.
Different private punishers are unlikely to punish similarly placed offenders in similar amounts. And as their actions are less easily subjected to public scrutiny, private persons are less easily compelled to punish for the right reasons—in order to do justice rather than settle scores, get revenge, or maximise their profit margins Moore a, 42; Edwards forthcoming.
Avoiding these costs is a strong reason to opt for the second set of rules. True, that set prevents proportionate punishment being imposed by our imagined moot court. But it is plausible to think that this benefit is outweighed by the aforementioned costs.
Why top US universities have law schools but not police schools
If it is, those who appeal to impersonal values to justify criminal law can explain why the moot court is not permitted to force us to give up our money. According to the second objection, what justifies having criminal law is its role in stabilizing valuable institutions. By preventing these wrongs, and holding wrongdoers responsible, we stabilize the institutions.
The contrast between a general justification focused on moral wrongdoing, and one focused on institutional stability, therefore turns out to be a false contrast Tadros These observations help make a more general point.
We can accept that criminal law is a tool properly used to support financial, educational, familial, military, and political institutions. If this kind of general justification is not too restrictive, is it nonetheless too expansive? This was the first of the three objections raised above. We need not infer that criminal law is unconcerned with moral wrongness.
We need only accept that there are facts about criminalization which give law-makers a duty not to criminalize some moral wrongs. There are many such facts, and their force varies depending on the wrong Simester and von Hirsch—; Moore In some cases, criminalizing a wrong will inevitably result in selective enforcement, raising concerns about selection being made on discriminatory grounds. In others, enforcement would necessitate gross invasions of privacy, and require the law to take sides in conflicts better resolved by the parties themselves.
There is often value in freely choosing not to act wrongly, and in so choosing for the right reasons, rather than because one was coerced: It will almost inevitably divert scarce resources from other valuable priorities. And there is often reason to think that criminalization will not result in there being less wrongdoing in the world.
Criminal conduct may be driven underground rather than made less common. Institutions of punishment may house unseen abuse and victimization. Ex-offenders may be driven towards crime by their reduced prospects in life. Where reasons like these generate a duty not to criminalize a wrong, the conduct in question is no business of the criminal law. The Limits of Criminal Law No-one denies that some things should not be criminalized. What is less clear is how we are to work out what these things are.
One approach is to seek constraints on permissible criminalization. Even if the values that justify having criminal law count in favour of criminalization, our reasons to do so may be defeated by reasons that count against.
A constraint identifies conditions under which the latter reasons always win. Consider, for example, the wrongfulness constraint: Principles like W give us a line we can draw without reference to at least some morally salient particulars. Conduct that falls outside the line may not be criminalized come what may. Imagine we are considering whether to make it a crime to possess guns. Doing so will prevent a great deal of harmful wrongdoing that cannot be prevented otherwise.
This is a powerful moral reason to criminalize. But if W is sound, and gun possession is not morally wrongful, that powerful reason is irrelevant to the decision with which we are faced. We are not permitted to criminalize, however much harm criminalization would prevent Moore72—73; Simester and von Hirsch22—23; Duff b, — Some suspect that all purported constraints on criminalization fail Duff et al44—52; Tadros91— This is not to say that anything goes.
It is rather to say that we cannot use a line like that drawn by W to work out what is permissibly criminalized. To trace the limits of the criminal law, we must engage in a more complex normative exercise: The limits of the criminal law cannot be traced in advance of this exercise.
Instead, they are determined by it.Understand Criminal Law in 18 Minutes (Part I)
The constraint to which most attention has been paid is the so-called harm principle. It is nowadays widely recognised that there is no single such principle.
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Rather, there are many harm principles Tadros a; Tomlin b; Edwards These principles have very different implications. That conduct is harmful, or unreasonably risks harm, does not show that we will prevent a proportionate amount of harm by criminalizing it.
Conversely, we may be able to prevent harm only by criminalizing conduct that is harmless, and that does not unreasonably risk harm.
To see the first point, consider the use of drugs. Criminalizing use may turn a drug into forbidden fruit that is more attractive to potential consumers, and place production in the hands of criminal gangs who make consumption ever more harmful.
Users may become less willing to seek medical treatment for fear of exposing their criminality, and may end up with criminal records that lead to social exclusion, and damage their employment prospects for years to come United Nations Where criminalization does have these effects, the harm it does is out of all proportion to any harm prevented.
To see the second point, consider the possession of guns. Possessing a gun is not itself harmful. And many possess guns without unreasonably risking harm. If one endorses HPPthings are different. What matters is not the effect of each instance of gun possession, but the effect of criminalizing all of them: To apply W we need to know what makes something morally wrongful. But while this is necessary, it may not be sufficient.
I have decisive reason not to go out in the rain without my umbrella. But it does not seem morally wrongful to do so Tadros11— Whatever the correct criterion, we must ask how law-makers are to apply it. We must also ask whether just any morally wrongful act will do. Some wrongful acts also violate rights, such that those who commit them wrong others. Some crimes are mala in se—they criminalize conduct that is morally wrongful independently of the law. Most crimes are mala prohibita—they criminalize conduct that, if morally wrongful at all, is morally wrongful partly in virtue of the fact that it is unlawful.
Is W compatible with the existence of mala prohibita? That depends on the extent to which changes in the law can produce changes in morality. The rules of the road are the classic case. Apart from the law, it is morally wrongful to drive dangerously. Such conduct is malum in se. What we should do to conform to this moral norm is not always obvious. To help, the law puts in place rules that tell us which side of the road to drive on, when to stop, and how fast we may go.
Imagine we obey these rules. In doing so, we drive more safely than we otherwise would have: One proposal is that it is morally wrongful to violate legal norms that have this effect: Mala prohibita of this kind would then be compatible with W. Of course, things are not so straightforward.
Even if legal conformity generally improves our moral conformity, there may be exceptional cases in which it does not—in which we can violate the rules of the road without putting anyone in danger, or in which violation helps keep everyone safe. And there may be people for whom even the generalization is not true—whose expertise enables them to systematically violate legal norms without creating risks any greater than those created by the rest of us.
Can an explanation be given of why these violations are nonetheless morally wrongful? If not, W implies that even morally beneficial mala prohibita—like the rules of the road—must ultimately be removed from the criminal law Husak—; Simester and von Hirsch24—29; Wellman Most views are comparative: One challenge is to identify the relevant baseline.
Are we harmed by an event if we are worse than we would have been if things had been different? If so, different how? Are we harmed if we are worse off than we were immediately beforehand? Or should we focus not on the position we were or would have been in, but on the position we should have been in morally speaking Holtug ; Tadros—? A second challenge is to determine in what way we must be worse off. The wider our answer to this question, the more likely it is that harm principles collapse into their supposed rivals.
Some say we are harmed when our interests are set back Feinberg31— But it is plausible to think that we have interests in avoiding disgust, annoyance, and dismay. Many people are disgusted, annoyed, or dismayed by what they take to be morally wrongful. On an interest-based view, they are also harmed.
Any harm principle that uses this notion of harm thus threatens to permit criminalization of much conventional immorality Devlin A narrower view has it that we are harmed only if our future prospects are reduced, because we are deprived of valuable abilities or opportunities Raz—; Gardner3—4; Simester and von Hirsch36— Disgust, annoyance, and offence need not—and often do not—have this effect.
So they need not be—and often are not—harmful. Whatever view of harm we take, we must also decide whether all harms count for the purposes of a given harm principle.
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People sometimes harm themselves, they are sometimes harmed by natural events, and harm is sometimes done consensually. Recall that if we endorse HPPwe must decide whether the harm criminalization prevents is proportionate to the harm it does. Can we include all the aforementioned harms in our calculations? Or must we only include harm done to others without their consent Mill ; Dworkin ; Feinberg ; Coons and Weber ?
Be that as it may, whether we take into account other harms remains important: As well as asking how constraints might be clarified, we must ask how they might be defended. One type of defence proceeds from within our theory of ideals. A theory of ideals includes an account of the values that bear upon how we should act, and of the priority relations between those values Hamlin and Stemplowska To see how such a theory might generate constraints, consider W.
One argument for that principle is the argument from conviction Simester and von Hirsch19— A second argument is the argument from punishment Husak92— One response to these arguments is that criminal law does not always censure or stigmatize.